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In this paper I wish to contribute to understanding of the connection between 
the Lysis and the Symposium. My purpose is not to suggest that the Symposium 
explains aporia at the end of the dialogue Lysis,1 but that the Symposium and 
the Lysis, taken as a pair, offer an interesting insight into the nature of human 
philosophical striving.
Since this insight concerns friendship and love, my alternative 
interpretation further provides a response to an influential criticism of Plato 
that his conception of love and friendship is impersonal (i.e. oriented only to 
the idea of the person and not to the individual person herself).2 
My strategy here is, first, to group the main arguments of the Lysis and 
the Symposium into five complex groups. This helps reveal the remarkable 
similarity in structure of both dialogues. Then, I interpret this similarity as an 
intertextual device that should convey a philosophical message. 
In the course of investigation, it will be necessary to consider one 
recent criticism of the intertextual reading of both dialogues. According to 
Christopher Rowe, there are two fundamental possibilities of viewing the 
connection between the Lysis and Symposium: either we stress the connection 
between both dialogues and argue for intertextuality and read the Lysis in the 
 1 The assumption that the ‘middle’ dialogues succeed where the ‘Socratic’ dialogues 
fail is rather a scholarly commonplace. E.g. Rowe (2000); Moutsopoulos (2008).
 2 Vlastos (1981), 31-32. 
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light of the Symposium or vice versa; or we admit that what we encounter here 
is merely a correspondence of certain type, kind or structure of a complex 
argument.3 Rowe warns that giving the preference to the intertextual reading 
would already imply the resolution of all serious issues about the unity and 
chronological succession of Plato’s dialogues. Above all, we should still respect 
Plato’s decision to give two formally different accounts. Therefore Rowe chooses 
second, more economical and safer alternative.4 
In this paper, I will go for both Rowe’s options, but I will not accept their 
exclusivity. Instead, I will advocate a different understanding of intertextuality: 
To think that we cannot understand Platonic doctrine of love and friendship 
properly if we read both dialogues independently does not necessarily imply 
denial of progress of Plato’s thought.5 Rather, in my reading, the problem of 
unity or progress in Plato becomes relatively minor. 
Since the extent of such plan of investigation exceeds by far the possibilities 
of the present paper, it will not be possible to fully discuss the details of both 
dialogues and I will certainly have to cut numerous corners. However, I hope 
that a general sketch of the problem can be given and seen as a plausible 
interpretation of how the intertextual connections work in Plato.
II. Connections between the Lysis and the Symposium
There is a very similar structure of five distinct arguments both in the Lysis 
and the Symposium. In case of the Lysis, the division in five parts is very 
natural: we can clearly distinguish an introductory dialogue between Socrates 
and Hippothales, three main parts of Socrates’ interrogation of Lysis and 
Menexenus, and the last aporetic part closed by arrival of the paidagogoi. The 
Symposium is naturally divided by the 7 acts of different speakers (Phaedrus, 
Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Socrates, and Alcibiades); 
these 7 speeches can nevertheless be arranged into five groups.6 
 3 Rowe (2000), 210.
 4 Ibid.,  211.
 5 Similarly, when we deny that the later dialogue corrects the earlier one, we do not 
claim that the later does not bring anything new.
 6 Cf. Krüger (1992). Although Krüger does not speak about five groups explicitly, 
he delivers cogent arguments for linking Pausanias with Eryximachus and 
Aristophanes with Agathon, respectively. 
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1) Naivety and ridiculousness of erotic love 
The introductory part of both the Lysis and the Symposium is dominated by 
the naive pre-philosophical believes of the proponents of Greek pederastic 
love. In the Lysis, Hippothales is presented as a passionate lover of young and 
handsome Lysis. His erotic love, which governs the introductory conversation 
between him and Socrates, makes him ridiculous in the eyes of his fellows (Lys. 
205c). 
The first speaker in the Symposium, young Phaedrus, delivers somehow 
naive speech, which is not only deep rooted in mythical way of thinking, 
but it even contains a logical mistake.7 What he wants is not to reveal truth 
about Eros, but to conform and maintain the traditional ‘erotic madness’.8 
Phaedrus’ conviction that there is not ‘any greater blessing to a young man 
beginning life than a virtuous lover, or to the lover than a beloved youth’ 
(Symp. 178c) would not only match the interests of Hippothales in the 
Lysis; it could also be very likely a conviction of Lysis himself, if he were 
educated by Hippothales. Phaedrus and Hippothales express the same 
state of consciousness, dominated by the traditional Greek erotic Pathos;9 
their ignorance must be corrected by subsequent more rational attempts to 
address the problem.
2) Erotic-educational poetry
In the Lysis, Socrates clarifies the principles of educational speech to erômenos. 
Erastês may not praise the boy, which is likely to make him harder to catch, 
but, on the contrary, lower him so as he becomes modest (Lys. 210e; cf. 206b). 
Socrates demonstrates such lowering of erômenos in that he persuades Lysis 
that he cannot expect being someone’s friend until he proves to be beneficial 
and good for him (Lys. 210d). Menexenus, in turn, is brought into aporia by 
 7 Phaedrus supports his main point, namely that ‘it is only lovers who are willing 
to die for someone else’ (Symp. 179b) by an example of Achilles who, although he 
actually died for Patroclus, was not the lover, but the beloved one (of Patroclus). 
See Gill (1999), xxi.
 8 There are two actual couples: Eryximachus and Phaedrus, and Pausanias and 
Agathon. See Prot. 315c-e; Phdr. 268a and Symp. 223b. Third, though much more 
complex couple is Socrates and Alcibiades. See Salman (1991), 214.
 9 Despite the fact that Hippothales is erastês (of Lysis) and Phaedrus erômenos (of 
Eryximachus).
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different meanings of the word philon.10 As a result, both boys are lowered by 
having been shown their uselessness (Lysis) or ignorance (Menexenus).
In the Symposium, Pausanias and Eryximachus deduce on the basis of the 
distinction between two kinds of Eros – the better and the worse one (Symp. 
180d ff. and 186b–d) 11 – that only a good man can be an object of ‘good’ Eros. 
This reminds us of what Socrates says to Lysis, namely that he cannot be loved 
by others unless he is beneficial and good (Lys. 210d). The shift from mythical 
to logical way of speaking can be interpreted as analogous to the shift from 
Hippothales’ erotic madness to Socrates’ rational erotic-educational speech in 
the Lysis. The fact that ‘erotic poetry’ of Pausanias and Eryximachus in fact 
contrasts with proper erotic poetry, displayed by Socrates in the Lysis,12 does 
not spoil the argument; on the contrary, it seems to give evidence of an inner 
link between both dialogues. 
3) Poetic understanding of friendship and love
In the Lysis, after the first attempt of definition of philia has gone wrong (Lys. 
213c), Socrates suggests to proceed in another direction.13 But he finds it hard to 
accept either of two ‘poetic’ (Homeric and Hesiodic) conceptions of friendship: 
that like is friendly to like or that unlike is friendly to unlike. Socrates decides 
to change his method again and skip from the ‘poetic’ to the ‘philosophical’ 
way of consideration.
 10 In present context, the fact that this outcome of the discussion with Menexenus is 
based on confusion of two meanings of the word philos, does not play so important 
role. Cf. Annas (1977), 532-533; Schulz (2000), 33-34; Price (1989), 3-4. 
 11 See Krüger (1992), 97-98. 
 12 Self-confident Pausanias and Eryximachus express a belief in individual 
independence, which contrasts with the later humble speech of Socrates, who 
– although he delivers new, even revolutionary thoughts – does not dare to put 
the sovereignty of traditional Eros into question. Cf. Szlezák (2008). The contrast 
between Pausanias and Eryximachus in the Symposium and Socrates in the Lysis 
consists also in the different effects of two kinds of erotic-educational poetry. 
While Socrates’ logoi make the young boys Lysis and Menexenus being down-to-
earth, which is necessary for becoming wise (Lys. 210d-e; cf. Symp. 215e f.), the 
speeches of Pausanias and Eryximachus would have rather made their erômenoi 
conceited and elitist (see Symp. 194b). Their goal is not to make the erômenoi 
better men, but to assure and strengthen the feeling of moral and intellectual 
superiority of the members of their pederastian circle.
 13 See Justin (2005), 76-77.
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The acts of the poets Aristophanes and Agathon in the Symposium recall 
the Socrates’ turn to the poets in the Lysis. Aristophanes’ myth about the 
original humans (Symp. 189d ff.) provides us with a mythical form of belief that 
are presented in logical form in the Lysis. So the cause of Eros, which is ‘desire 
for my other half ’ (Symp. 191a ff.), can be seen in the light of the Lysis as philia 
to something that is like (Lys. 214a) (this would match Aristophanes’ original 
same-gender humans) or unlike (Lys. 215c) (this would match Aristophanes’ 
original androgynies) myself. 
Agathon’s speech14 gives the main characteristic of Eros: besides being 
virtuous, he is young and tender (hapalos, Symp. 195d4).15 But tenderness and 
youth (that make Eros an object of praise) should, in Agathon’s speech, apply 
primarily not to Eros, but to Agathon himself. He is also young and tender;16 the 
virtues of Eros that he enumerates are in fact virtues of a technically competent 
poet.17 Socrates’ double ironical criticism of Agathon’s speech (Symp. 194a–c 
and 198a–199a) makes clear that it is no more sufficient than Homeric and 
Hesiodic accounts in the Lysis. But distinct logical (i.e. non-ironical) criticism 
of such conceited attitude can be found in the Lysis: as perfectly good and 
virtuous Agathon can hardly become anybody’s friend, i.e. the subject of 
someone’s love or friendship (Lys. 215a–b),18 and as tender (or smooth) he can 
 14 It resembles a real poem and is formally flawless. See particularly the final part of 
the speech at 197c ff.
 15 This latter – seemingly minor – characteristic of Eros possibly alludes to what has Socrates 
said about philon in the Lysis, namely that it is soft, smooth and slippery (malakos, leios, 
liparos) (Lys. 216c7). While adjectives leios and liparos go together with hapalos only 
by means of association, malakos can be linked with hapalos semantically – the basic 
meaning of both Greek expressions is ‘soft’. The belonging of all four words to the same 
metaphoric field is obvious. But while Socrates in the Lysis uses these characteristic to 
demonstrate the insufficiency of the poetic accounts on philon and philia in Homer and 
Hesiod, the poet Agathon is not only firmly convinced that he knows what is Eros, but 
the given characterisation shows that he even makes himself Eros-like. 
 16 An obvious allusion to the identity of Eros and Agathon is at Symp. 198a3; cf. 
Prot. 315e. The fact that Agathon’s oral poem celebrates himself reminds us of 
Hippothales in the Lysis, who seems to Socrates to be ridiculous in composing 
self-celebrating poems (Lys. 205d).
 17  Krüger (1992), 136.
 18 The preliminary argument from the Lysis 215a4-6 that ‘the good may be the friend 
of the good in so far as he is good, not so far as he is alike’ contains an implicit 
criticism of Aristophanes. His consideration about love does not take into account 
the moral notion of the good. 
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hardly be recognised as friendly or philon, i.e. as a object of love or friendship 
(Lys. 216d1). 
4) The main philosophical argument: 
Goal and cause of friendship
In both cases, the ‘poetic’ accounts are followed by the philosophically most 
important considerations of the dialogue.19 In the Lysis, Socrates claims that 
what is neither good nor bad becomes friend of good. The presence of evil (as far 
as it does not spoil the subject entirely – 217c–e) causes the desire (epithymia) 
for good. But this outcome still needs to be supplemented: consideration of 
the purpose of friendship shows that the given definition eventually leads to 
infinite regress of the objects of friendship. To avoid this, one must presuppose 
something that is first, original friendly (prôton philon, 219d1). Prôton philon 
is friendly solely for the sake of itself (220b5); as such, it is the original goal 
of all other friendships (219e f.), which will be friendly even if all evil would 
disappear (220d). And since friendship must have some cause (besides its 
goal, which is prôton philon) and desires that are neither good nor bad would 
remain even if evil would disappear, it is desire that is identified as the cause 
of friendship (221d). Socrates’ makes explicit that this definition of the goal 
and cause of friendship – contrary to the previous attempts – could be right 
(220a–b, 221d2–6; cf. 218d8–9). 
Socrates’ speech in the Symposium matches in several important points 
this part of the Lysis. Eros’ ‘middleness’ strikingly corresponds with the ‘neither 
good nor bad’ subject of friendship from the Lysis. The subsequent substitution 
of the beautiful by the good in the argument (Symp. 204d) agrees with the 
parallelism of both expressions in the main part of the Lysis (cf. 216c–d). This 
substitution prepares the field for the next stage of the argument, in which 
the ultimate goal and cause of love is revealed. Happiness, which has no other 
purpose (Symp. 204e–205a), recalls the finality of prôton philon in the Lysis 
(219c);20 but this is still too general account of love. The final goal, the true 
object of love is the good (Symp. 205e); the cause of love is desire to have it 
continuously (Symp. 206a). The assertion that the object of true love is the 
good and not something akin or ‘one’s own’ (Symp. 205e) is not only criticism 
 19 Annas (1977), 535, to the contrary, regards this part of the Lysis as a blind passage 
of argumentation.
 20 Cf. Euthyd. 278e3-282a6; Men. 77b6-78b2.
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of what Aristophanes has previously claimed about ‘seeking one’s other part’, 
but it also disproves the final wrong turn in the argument of Lys. 221d–222a. 
The final stage of Socrates’ speech (210a ff.) reveals in a somehow mystical 
way (compare the ‘prophetic inspiration’ in the corresponding passage in Lys. 
216c–d) the gradual character of the pursuing the object of love – the good 
(Symp. 210a–212a). 
5) The closing part
But the philosophically most important passage in both dialogues does not 
remain the last word: the dialogue is ‘eased’ by a comic part. In the Lysis, 
Socrates first commits a mistake in logical inferring.21 Then, using an emotional 
sophistic means, which makes Lysis and Menexenus agree with next partial 
proposition,22 Socrates arrives at the surprising conclusion, which benefits the 
lover Hippothales:23 if anyone loves anyone else, he is related (oikeion) to the 
beloved one and (by the previous premise) must be loved by who is related to 
him (221e7–222a3). No wonder that, after involving the question of relation 
between oikeion and the good (222c), the dialogue ends in aporia. Finally, the 
aporetic situation is intensified by the wild intervention of the paidagogoi who 
brake off the discussion.
The comical act of Alcibiades in the Symposium along with what follows 
forms the last part of the dialogue. The author of the dialogue, similarly as 
in the Lysis, obviously did not want to finish with a positive account of love. 
The appearance of drunken Alcibiades and begin of the informal drinking 
party could be seen as corresponding to Socrates’ deliberate corruption of the 
discussion and to the rude irruption of drunken paidagogoi in the Lysis.24
 21 P1: Anyone who desires desires what he lacks (object of desire that is friendly 
to him). P2: That what he lacks is something that he is deprived of. C (partial): 
Thus the object of love, friendship and desire is something own and relative to 
him (oikeion) (Lys. 221e). [Failing (and questionable) premise P3: That what he is 
deprived of is something relative to him.]
 22 ‘If you are philoi, you are naturally related to one another.’ (Lys. 221e5-6)
 23 Note that Socrates suddenly begins to speak about erotic love instead of friendship 
(Lys. 222a).
 24 See the parallels between Alcibiades and Diotima drawn by Nussbaum (1986), 
165-199; Rosen (1999), 278-327.
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III. Intertextual connections
It seems to be clear that both the Lysis and the Symposium operate with the 
same structure of five complex groups of belief. This striking similarity raises 
the question whether the author of the Symposium does not simply repeat the 
tried and tested scheme from the Lysis. What is more, Socrates uses in both 
dialogues very similar strategy of argumentation, disproves wrong belief 
and persuades the interlocutors by very similar means. We have even seen 
substantial correspondence between the ideas: Socrates in both dialogues 
arrives at the distinction between the cause and the goal of friendship and love 
(Lys. 218d8–9; Symp. 206a3–4). The cause is desire in both cases; the goal is the 
good in the Symposium and prôton philon, the last friendly thing, which must 
necessary be good (Lys. 219a–c, 221c), in the Lysis.
Yet, is this enough to claim intertextuality? Let us consider Rowe’s point, 
namely that to admit a weaker correspondence of certain kind offers safer 
and more economical interpretation of the connections between the Lysis 
and the Symposium. Rowe’s argument seems – if slightly specified – to be of 
crucial importance: What could have led the author to write two different 
dialogues on very similar topic, with very similar structure and succession of 
argumentation? A possible solution occurs, when we ask a related question 
concerning the similarity in structure: Is there any point in covering the most 
serious findings about friendship and love with a veil of mystical induction 
or prophetic inspiration and then even palliate them by a comic act? In what 
follows, I will consider the comical endings of both dialogues and, in light of it, 
somehow peculiar behaviour of Socrates in them.
1) Contrasting ends
The aporetic ending of the Lysis, stressed by invasion of uncivil slaves and 
Socrates’ exclamation of his ridiculousness (Lys. 223b), leaves the reader with 
an impression of unrest. The mature participants of the dialogue have been 
left to themselves, and the consequence is their alleged ridiculousness caused 
by their inability to give an appropriate account of friendship; moreover, their 
young pleasant companions have been taken away from them (Lys. 222d–e, 
223b). The ‘intonation’ of the dialogue rises sharply to a question mark. 
In the Symposium, by contrary, everything seems to support the impression 
that the answer has actually been given. Not even the wild entrée of Alcibiades, 
which disrupts the common praise of Socrates’ performance, can spoil that 
impression. Since Alcibiades repeatedly acknowledges Socrates’ victory (Symp. 
213e, 219c, 220a, 222a), his act rather stresses the fact that Socrates’ speech was 
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the final and correct pray of Eros. What happens thereafter is a slow calming 
of the scene by drinking and informal entertainment. Socrates, who is always 
drinking but never drunk, lulls his companions to sleep. The ‘intonation’ falls 
to complete peace of a sleeping man. Nothing could be more appropriate in 
this situation when answer has been given. 
2) Socrates’ behaviour
What is the reason of this striking contrast of the endings of both dialogues? 
Why does Plato give the full account of love in the Symposium but not in the 
Lysis? What does this strange combination of similarity in structure and direct 
contrast in the endings mean? A possible answer may be found in Socrates’ 
somehow peculiar behaviour in both dialogues.
a) Socrates’ pretence
According to Szlezák, Socrates features in different roles in the Symposium.25 
Two most apparent of them stand opposed to each other: the role of ‘elenchian’ 
dialectician, who knows that he knows nothing (expressed by his position of 
Diotima’s disciple), contrasts with the role of knowing, supreme and admired 
teacher (expressed in Alcibiades’ apotheosis of Socrates). As Szlezák claims, 
the far more important and, in fact, the only authentic role of Socrates is the 
latter one.26 Socrates knows about love and he only pretends his ignorance 
about it (and he also pretends to be but Diotima’s student). The reason that 
leads him to pretend ignorance is his moderation and respect to the discussing 
society. Ironical fiction of his ignorance should protect him against the danger 
to behave like a self-confident expert. Such behaviour would have destructive 
effect on character of present youth.27 
Socrates’ behaviour in the Lysis seems to be similar; but, given the 
extraordinary youth of his audience, it is not surprising that he pretends even 
more here. Though Socrates is far from being ignorant about the nature of 
friendship and though he has already made important allusions to it (prôton 
philon as the goal of friendship, its closeness to the good, desire as the cause of 
friendship, and the ‘middleness’ of the loving subject), his aim is much more 
 25 Szlezák (2008).
 26 Ibid. 
 27 We have already seen educational fiasco of such conceited ‘experts’ like 
Eryximachus and Pausanias.
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complex than simply give everything away. Lysis and Menexenus are young, 
inexperienced boys and Socrates knows that he should display a great deal 
of respect and moderation in relation to them. Thus one reason to pretend 
ignorance could very plausibly be analogical to Socrates’ motives in the 
Symposium. 
But why does Socrates not use the same figure as in the Symposium, i.e. 
to put the truth about friendship into the mouth of someone else? Educational 
poetry obviously does not exclude using narration. The reason for putting 
the plausible ideas of the philosophical part of the Lysis aside must be sought 
elsewhere than only in educational principles. In a word, though Socratic 
pretence plays an important role in both dialogues, the Lysis hides more. If we 
succeed in explaining the reason of this ‘more’, it can tell us much about the 
aims of the author. 
b) Socrates’ conflict of roles 
The key consideration consists in connecting the interplay between the 
particular characters in the Lysis with what is said about different purposes 
of friendship at Lys. 210d. In order to understand this connection, one should 
focus closely on what is Socrates really doing in the Lysis. 
In fact, Socrates’ explicit aim in the Lysis is not to reveal the nature of 
friendship, but to show Hippothales how should one talk to one’s beloved and 
(implicitly) to help him win Lysis. The argumentative fallacy at the end of the 
dialogue (Lys. 221d–e) has obviously been committed in favour of Hippothales 
(222a8; see above). This makes clear that Socrates in the Lysis is motivated 
not only by educational concern for the boys. We can even see that Socrates is 
somehow torn between wanting to be a good teacher and loyalty to Hippothales. 
The latter motive is obviously responsible for the failure of the argument, since 
it goes against the educational motives that would require a clear, un-sophistic 
reasoning. In other words, though it is obvious that ‘true’ educational speech 
should lower students’ self-confidence, it seems hard to accept that it should 
proceed at the expense of logical trick. 
We find Socrates in unusual situation, in which he is forced to choose 
between education and loyalty, and, moreover, between truth and cheating. 
Why does the author trap Socrates in such regrettable conflict of roles? 
Loyalty appears to be something that has a value of its own. In present 
context (i.e. context of the dialogue about friendship), it is very likely that this 
loyalty is but another term for alliance or friendship. Socrates’ motivation in this 
case would be then to become ally or friend of Hippothales. Since friendship 
is, according to Lys. 210d, motivated either by good or by usefulness, we can 
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consider Socrates’ conflict of roles in the dialogue to be a dilemma between 
being a true teacher and being a useful or good friend.
c) Socrates’ self-irony
But Hippothales is not the only person whose friendship Socrates desires. There 
are altogether three passages in the dialogue, in which Socrates in somehow 
confidential spirit turns to his companions in order to attract their favour. The 
means, which should contribute to this intimacy, is Socrates’ comicality of his 
self-characterization and openness to others. 
When Socrates offers Hippothales to show how one should talk to 
erômenos he claims not to know about anything except the matters of love 
(Lys. 204b8–c2). At 211d–212a Socrates describes himself as a lifelong lover 
of friendship who nevertheless is far away from achieving it and who admires 
the lightness with which the young boys become friends. At Lys. 223b, Socrates’ 
another self-characterisation addresses the difference of age again: Socrates 
presents himself as an old man (among other old men) who is ignorant about 
the question who is friend. 
A common feature of all these characterisations (whose importance can 
also be seen in fact that they appear at the beginning, in the middle and at the 
end of the dialogue) is the presence of self-ironic humour.28 It is worth noting 
that in all three mentioned passages, Socrates’ self-irony is directed to some of 
the present persons: in the first case it should promote trust in Hippothales, in 
the last case it should foster the feeling of solidarity among old men after the 
youth has been taken away. 
In the second passage (Lys. 211d), where Socrates turns in confidence 
to Menexenus (though his speech is undoubtedly directed to both boys), the 
ironically tinged humour culminates. Socrates evokes a mood of confession; 
the humour of the situation is derived from the fact that it is not the young 
student who opens his heart to his experienced and sovereign teacher, but the 
old man who seeks pity and sympathy of the younger for his condition. The 
inversion of roles is distinct here and the author obviously wants us to notice it. 
Socrates confesses his age-long love for friends, which he equates to someone’s 
soft spot for horses and dogs. At the moment when he – seemingly accidentally 
– follows up his comic swearword ‘by dog’ with a mention about passion for 
dogs,29 the reader cannot resist thinking that Socrates wants to amuse the boys. 
 28 E.g. Lys. 204e, 205c-d, 207a, c, 211c, e.
 29 ‘… horse or dog. I believe, by dog (!) ...’ (Lys. 211e6)
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In present context, I incline to believe that Socrates is motivated by his desire to 
make friends with the boys, the thing which he finds so hard to achieve. 
If we look at the connection between the interplay of the particular 
characters and the motivation for friendship at 210d again, we can conclude 
that Socrates is surely beneficial to Hippothales (because he is helping him 
to achieve his goal) and good and beneficial to both Menexenos and Lysis 
(because his educational erotic poetry helps make them better men) and 
therefore, he can be considered friend of them.30 On the other hand, he still 
regrets that he cannot make friends with them in a spontaneous way such as 
they can. It does not play any role here whether this regret is or is not an irony; 
the fact of matter is that Socrates sees their spontaneous friendship which 
persists despite their character differences and he attempts to approach their 
spontaneity by humour.31 Being humorous can thus be seen as, besides being 
good and being beneficial, the third motive for friendship. A short look at the 
Aristotelian account of friendship (EN VIII.3), which Plato surely anticipates 
here, offers the lacking conceptual framework for this third motive: being 
pleasant.
3) Socrates’ ‘tragedy’
However, Socrates’ attempt is vain; he does not succeed in making spontaneous 
friends with the boys. The dramatic function of the arrival of the slaves is to 
symbolically highlight his failure. The connection between Socrates’ behaviour 
and three different motives for friendship makes obvious that Socrates’ failure 
has to do with his role of philosophical educator. The educator, whose goal is 
to make students good and wise, cannot – despite being self-ironical – be a 
pleasant friend. Being a genuine educator and not a sophistic courtier, he asks 
difficult questions, corrects and supervises the students. 
This might be seen rather as a common experience from everyday life; 
but the Lysis shows that the situation is essentially tragic in nature: knowing 
of friendship implies inability of it. Friendship requires spontaneous and 
reciprocated committing oneself to another person. There is actual embodiment 
of such friendship in the Lysis, which needs no further comments – the relation 
between Lysis and Menexenos; they are real, sincere friends, even though their 
characters are quite different (and Plato spends a lot of time on making this 
obvious in the dialogue) and even though they have no real knowledge about 
 30 See Scott (2000), 74-80.
 31 And he succeeds sometimes, cf. 207c.
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friendship they actually practice. On the other hand, Socrates, who obviously 
has knowledge of friendsip, is not able to make friends with them. He is but a 
ridiculous comedian who is at the same time stuck in the tragic fate of an old 
philosopher.
Now, I wish to claim that the intertextual connection between the Lysis 
and the Symposium conveys that that failure of educating philosopher to make 
friends happens not accidentally, but necessarily. This failure could be in light 
of the Lysis alone seen as caused by the fact of Socrates’ ‘double allegiance’ (to 
the boys and to Hippothales): who keeps a foot in both camps cannot become 
a real friend of anybody; and the arrival of the slaves makes the situation 
impossible to improve. 
However, the ending of the Symposium shows that Socrates could hardly 
succeed even if he were not in conflict of roles and even if slaves would have 
not appeared. In the Symposium, Socrates is obviously not burdened by double 
allegiance. He successfully ignores every attempt to distract him from the 
substantial core of what he wants to say; he even seems not to be moved by 
Alcibiades’ profession of love. It might look that the Symposium presents more 
matured Socrates whose developed metaphysics and dialectics have helped 
him solve his dilemmas of friendship from the Lysis.32 
But in fact, the tragedy of philosophical educator happens in the Symposium 
again. Agathon, who is absolutely ignorant about true love, is the beloved of 
Pausanias; the same goes for Phaedrus and Eryximachus. Socrates, on the other 
hand, having complete knowledge of love, cannot help correcting and preach 
at others as Alcibiades rightly condemns. He is the one who is always right and 
who cannot help cheating and humiliating in actual love relationships (though 
with good intentions). 
It would be mistake to think that there is not a sign of double motivation 
in what Socrates does in the Symposium. His conception of middle Eros is 
not a purely theoretical concept; its other task is to show that Socrates, who 
seemingly is motivated only by the heavenly good and beauty, is still capable 
of human friendship. This is what could go unnoticed unless we consider the 
Symposium together with the Lysis. The difference in endings of both dialogues 
brilliantly reveals their profound similarity; the disquieting end of the Lysis 
shows that Socrates in the Symposium has overcome the gap between human 
and divine love only seemingly. In fact, he is doomed to leave the symposium 
alone after lulling everyone to sleep.
 32 This is a standard genetic account of the development of Plato’s thought. 
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If this interpretation is correct, then both the Lysis and the Symposium 
need each other in order to give full account of Socrates’ problem. Without the 
Symposium, aporia in the Lysis can be considered as an outcome of Socrates’ 
double allegiance. Without the Lysis, one could oversee the hints to the same 
point in the Symposium. Shortly, both dialogues obviously represent parts 
of the same project. But what is exactly the nature of this project and does it 
provide an answer to Rowe’s problem?
4) Destiny of the philosopher
There are in fact two conceptions of love and friendship: human and divine. 
Although Socrates knows that value of divine love is much higher (and 
– knowing this – he is familiar with divine love), he equally knows that he 
lacks lower, human love. Although Socrates tries to overcome the gap between 
human and divine love by the conception of ‘middle’ Eros that is able to link 
both spheres (the link to which is the ‘middleness’ of the subject of friendship 
in the Lysis), his actual behaviour convicts him of a failure. Socrates, much like 
his Eros, to whom he has been compared, cannot narrow this tragic gap. The 
Lysis shows that Socrates is aware of this tragedy; his awareness gives evidence 
that he was far from ignoring personal love, as Vlastos puts it. 
But despite the tragic comedy, one of the answers to the problem of love 
and friendship still remains higher. Socrates is unpleasant, but he has the divine 
answer. Plato reminds us of this fundamental possibility of human life again.33 
Decision for philosophy inevitably means decision for solitude. This holds 
even though Socrates is constantly surrounded by the crowd of students; his 
behaviour in both dialogues about friendship and love shows that educational-
philosophical partnership is not able to do justice to everything which man 
could hope for in loving. The genuine comic tragedy of the philosopher lies 
in the fact that he, in important respects, remains solitary. In this very sense, 
Socrates before his death, far from taking into account those who remain,34 
 33 It is entirely possible that Plato himself never felt it necessary to narrow the 
gap between human and divine love. Since divine love offers the most ample 
recompense for all the human trouble, Plato could be content with what we call 
‘destiny of the philosopher’. Yet, it is the stamp of Plato’s greatness as a philosopher 
that even though he developed this ‘philosophical’ solution of the problem he 
endeavours not to conceal the other side of story, which may be considered tragic 
by others. 
 34 See especially Phaed. 60a.
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displays the attitude of philosopher. Just in this sense, Jan Patočka said about 
Heidegger’s death (only several months before his own death) that it was the 
most meaningful thing Heidegger could ever do.35 
IV. Conclusion
The Lysis and the Symposium represent a pair, in which intertextuality works. 
Both dialogues can be divided into five complex groups that are mutually 
connected. These intertextual connections strengthen the given ideas, among 
which the most important are the principles of education and the distinction 
between the goal and the cause of love and friendship.
What is more, conceived as a pair, the dialogues answer one of the most 
acute questions that philosophers have to face, namely: How does philosophy 
affect relation of the philosopher to his fellowmen? This question is not directly 
addressed in either of the dialogues (and is thereby one of the great topics that 
Plato does not want to make explicit). But both dialogues, being the parts of 
a continuous project, suggest, in the intertextual context, an answer to this 
question.
To be sure, this is not to say that nothing has been changed between the 
Lysis and the Symposium. On the contrary, the philosophical theory of love 
could possibly have been improved; at any rate, it is now explicitly founded 
in Plato’s metaphysics. Yet, this improvement applies primarily to what we 
have called divine love; the key insight concerning the human love is held 
unchanged throughout both dialogues. Again, this cannot occure as long 
as we consider the dialogues separately. Reading the Lysis in the light of the 
Symposium clarifies the philosophical theory of love and friendship; reading of 
the Symposium in the light of the Lysis reveals that some dilemmas concerning 
the human love remain and must be displayed again. Thus, despite Rowe’s 
doubts, intertextuality does not necessary imply resolution of all questions 
about chronological succession of Plato’s dialogues. 
As we have seen, the answer to above mentioned question emerges when 
we ask: What reason could have let Plato to discredit his substantial findings 
about love and friendship by the mystic and humorous factor at the scene? 
While mysticism is an educational means of the knowing but humble teacher, 
who wants to raise the soul of his students to the philosophical heights, humour 
is a means through which he tries to be an amusing companion. It need not 
 35 See Rezek (1993), 54.
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be stressed that these two tasks pull against each other. Socrates spends a 
lot of time in trying to overcome this opposition. While in the Symposium 
the involvement of ‘middle’ Eros makes this attempt more theoretical, his 
comic acting in the Lysis can be interpreted as a practical attempt to become 
friend. 
Nevertheless, the Lysis shows that though Socrates succeeds in being a 
good educator he fails in being an amusing companion. In the Symposium, 
though he has convinced everybody of the connection between divine and 
human love, he still has not overcome solitude of the philosopher. We have 
seen that in the contemporary philosophy the same point has been recognised; 
it can hardly be expressed more lucidly than Heidegger puts it: ‘Im Denken 
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